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COMMENT
SECURITIES REGULATION-EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICA-
TION-Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc.
- In this era of transnational investment and acquisition, the courts
have had to address, with increasing frequency, the troublesome
boundaries of the extraterritorial application of United States securi-
ties laws, because investment in domestic markets and corporations is
not limited to domestic investors.1 Fraudulent actions, initiated by and
perpetrated upon American citizens, have caused the courts to consider
appropriate guidelines for the granting of subject matter jurisdiction in
applying the antifraud sections of federal securities laws to transna-
tional securities dealings. Although regulations governing the issuance
and sale of securities within the United States are extensive, neither
the statutes nor the rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) provide adequate guidance as to how they should
be applied transnationally.2 Indeed, it was long presumed that absent
1. See United States v. Cook, 573 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1978); Des Brisay v. Goldfield
Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kasser, 548
F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd. v.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540
F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Travis v.
Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
See generally Buschman, Antifraud and the Water's Edge: Transnational Transac-
tions, Rule 10(b)-5 and the Federal Securities Code, 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 232 (1979); Hacker
& Rotunda, The Extraterritorial Regulation of Foreign Business under the U.S. Securi-
ties Laws, 59 N.C. L. Rav. 643 (1981); Johnson, Application of Foreign Securities Laws
to International Securities Transactions 45 ALB. L. Rav. 890 (1981); Note, American
Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HAv. L. Rzv. 553 (1976); Com-
ment, The Transnational Reach of Rule IOB-5, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1363 (1973) (for dis-
cussions of the importance of these precedents).
2. See Loss, Extraterritoriality in the Federal Securities Code, 20 HARV. INT'L L. J.
305 (1979). The SEC has not exercised rulemaking authority granted in § 30(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78
dd(b) (1976) [hereinafter cited as the '34 Act]. This section "makes the '34 Act inappli-
cable 'to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdic-
tion of the United States unless he transacts such business in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to
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an expression of congressional intent, federal legislation was to apply
solely within the territorial limits of the United States.3 In order not to
thwart the remedial purpose of the securities acts, the courts have be-
gun to evolve standards for determining circumstances where extrater-
ritorial applications of the law are both appropriate and necessary.
4
Beginning with the landmark case of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,'
the courts have evolved two tests for the granting of subject matter
jurisdiction over the conduct of foreign persons and entities. The first
test is predicated on conduct within the United StatesO and the second
is based on effects within the United States of conduct occurring
largely abroad.7 In Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific
Oilseeds, Ltd.,' the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized
that in the case of a fraudulent scheme of nondisclosure of material
prevent the evasion of this title.'" Loss at 305 (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). "The
foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction of any statute as
intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
lawmaker has general and legitimate power." Id. at 357. Accord Foley Bros., Inc. v. Fi-
lardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
4. See, e.g., Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977).
5. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). Stressing the
importance of the protection of American interests, the Second Circuit extended the ap-
plication of the '34 Act regarding securities transactions on United States stock ex-
changes, whenever "necessary to protect American interests." 405 F.2d at 206. In this
case, an American stockholder of a Canadian oil company brought an action against the
controlling shareholders, who were the company directors, alleging that they had con-
spired to defraud the company by forcing it to sell treasury shares at a market price
which the directors knew did not reflect true value. Id. at 204. The shareholders' deriva-
tive suit alleged that this failure to disclose and the subsequent action on the basis of the
inside information constituted violations of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Id. Subject matter
jurisdiction was based upon the fact that although the sale was transacted entirely in
Canada, the corporate stock was traded on the American Stock Exchange. Noting that
the intent of the '34 Act is to protect investors and the markets against improprieties,
the court focused not on the conduct itself, but rather on the effects. Id. at 206, 209. See
also Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 1, at 645. Although the fraud was committed outside
the United States, its effects were felt within and, consequently, the court held that ju-
risdiction properly existed. 405 F.2d at 209. See also Strassheim v. Dailey, 221 U.S. 280
(1911); United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
6. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); Travis
v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp.
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
7. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975); lIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
8. 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 4
COMMENT
facts, devised in the United States and then "exported" to Australia,9
jurisdiction based solely on conduct could be granted, despite the diffi-
culty of actually assigning a situs to the fraud involved.10 The culmina-
tion of the actual sales transaction occurred in Australia," but the
heart of the plaintiffs claim was that prior to the sale, the defendants,
who were the stockholders of Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., had organized and
perpetuated a scheme to withhold material information from the plain-
tiffs, the purchasers of all of the stock.1" Although the effect of these
transactions on domestic American interests was minimal,13 the con-
duct involved in the fraud did occur within the United States and was
deemed significant enough to warrant the intervention of an American
court.
Continental Grain Pty. Ltd. (Continental) was the Australian sub-
sidiary of an American company."' In August 1974, Continental pur-
chased all the stock of Pacific Oilseeds, Ltd. (PacSeeds) from its three
stockholders," Australian Chemical Holdings Ltd. (Australian Chemi-
cal), 16 POI, a California corporation 7 and Carl Ernest Classen, presi-
dent of POI.1' At the time of this transaction, PacSeeds was a party to
a ten year licensing agreement with Northrup, King and Co. (Nor-
thrup), a Minnesota corporation, whereby Northrup supplied PacSeeds
with Hybrid sorghum parental materials." This licensing agreement,
which provided for the continued availability of hybrid seedstock, con-
stituted the primary asset of PacSeeds.2 0
9. Id. at 420. By "exported" the court means that the scheme to defraud was essen-
tially developed and carried out in the United States and then later perpetrated on the
foreign defendants. While formulated in one country, the actual fraud was felt abroad,
hence the "exportation." Id.
10. Id. at 420 n.17.
11. Id. at 420.
12. Id. at 411-12.
13. Both Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. and Pacific Oilseeds (Australia) Pty.
Ltd. were Australian corporations. Id. at 411.
14. Id. The parent company, a Delaware corporation, had an accounting system
whereby any losses experienced by the subsidiary were reflected in the parent's financial
picture. Continental argued that a loss suffered by it constituted a domestic effect under
the effects test, thus requiring the grant of subject matter jurisdiction. While jurisdiction
was granted, the effect of this accounting was held by both the district court and the
Eighth Circuit to be too remote to provide an adequate jurisdictional basis. Id. at 417.
15. Id. at 411. PacSeeds was an Australian corporation. Id.
16. Id. Australian Chemical held 51% of PacSeeds' stock. Id.
17. Id. POI, a subsidiary of PVO Int'l, another California corporation, held 48% of
PacSeeds' stock. Id.
18. Id. Claussen held 1% of PacSeeds' stock. Id.
19. Sorghum is a grass, cultivated as a grain or as a source of syrup. Northrup culti-
vated and provided the basic seedstock. Id.
20. Id. Prior to the acquisition, Continental obtained a copy of this agreement and
19821
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The entire acquisition was negotiated between Continental and
Peter Leech, the managing director of Australian Chemical, who acted
as an agent for the three vendors.2" The purchase proposal was pre-
mised on the vendors' guarantee that PacSeeds would retain use of the
seedstock currently held after the termination of the license agree-
ment. 22 Leech, who believed the use to be unrestricted, forwarded the
offer to Claussen at POI.'5 Prior to receiving the offer, Claussen was
aware of Northrup's intention to reclaim the seedstock at the termina-
tion of the license.24 Informing Leech of this development, Claussen
and POI indicated that PacSeeds would not guarantee the seedstock's
use and that it would be "Continental's problem."2 5 In addition, Claus-
sen requested of Northrup that they not "spoil the deal with Continen-
tal by telling Continental of Northrup King's intention to reclaim the
seedstock upon the termination of the license agreement. '2'
Northrup formally terminated the license agreement in June 1974,
notifying Claussen that the license was not transferable and that Nor-
thrup did not intend to renew it with Continental.2 7 The letter also
specified that Northrup intended to reclaim the seedstock and that
PacSeeds could not dispose of it. At no time during the course of the
negotiations did any one of the vendors or Northrup inform Continen-
tal of Northrup's intentions.' 8 Although the contract for the sale of
PacSeeds was executed in California, the actual closing was held in
Sydney, Australia in August 1974. 2" The initial payment was made in
Australian dollars and the balance was paid after a post-closing audit
sought legal advice from two law firms, one in New York and the other in Australia. Both
firms assured Continental that the seedstock would remain available to PacSeeds after
the end of the agreement with Northrup. Id. at 411-12. This legal advice led the court to
question "causation in fact," meaning that the legal advice may have been the basis of
Continental's purchase. Causation is a necessary element of a private action under §
10(b) and Rule 10(b)-5 of the '34 Act. This reliance, however, was not established. Id. at
412 n.1.
21. Id. at 411. None of the POI representatives, including defendant Claussen, had
any direct contact with Continental. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 411-12.
26. Id. at 411. This statement gave rise to a claim by Continental that Northrup was
a part of the "conspiracy of silence" and led to the institution of a suit against Northrup
in the District Court of Minn. Id. at 412 n.2.
27. Id. at 412.
28. Id. The materiality of this so-called "scheme of nondisclosure" was the basis of
Continental's claim of securities fraud. Id.
29. The closing was held in Australia, rather than in the United States, in order to
avoid certain tax consequences. Id. at 412-13.
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in November 1974.80 In the interval between the two payments, the
license agreement expired and was not renewed. 1
Continental brought an action in the United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota alleging violations by POI and Claussen ss
of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193488 and Rule 10b-5."
The complaint further asserted common law fraud, breach of contract
and material misrepresentations in the warranty language of the con-
tract.3 The district court dismissed for lack of both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction against POI and Claussen.se The district court
considered activities such as the negotiations between Claussen, Aust.
Chem., POI and Northrup King and found that "POI and Claussen
had engaged in no actionable conduct within the United States to en-
able the court to exercise jurisdiction under § 10(b) and that the al-
leged effect (the decreased value of the PacSeeds stock as reflected in
the financial records of Continental's parent company, Continental
30. Id. at 413.
31. Id. In response to Continental's actions against Northrup, a counterclaim was
filed by Northrup for an accounting, return of the hybrid seedstock and punitive dam-
ages. Id. at 412 n.2 (citing Pacific Oilseeds (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Northrup, King and
Co., No. 4-47 Civ. 602 (D. Minn. dismissed with prejudice, July 26, 1978)).
32. Australian Chemical was not joined because its inclusion would have defeated
diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 414 n.5.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976). The provision states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
Id.
34. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). This rule provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements, made in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
35. 592 F.2d at 413.
36. Id.
1982]
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Grain Corporation) was too remote. 3 7
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the scheme of fraudulent
nondisclosure devised in the United States and perpetrated by the use
of the mails and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce was
conduct sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction." Recogniz-
ing the significance of the conduct, the court reversed and remanded
the case to the district court, stating that although the ultimate effect
was felt in Australia, the scheme of nondisclosure was devised and
completed in the United States and was then "exported" to
Australia."
International law recognizes the principle that every state retains
the ability to establish standards of conduct within its borders for any
actor, whether citizen or alien.4 0 By attaching consequences to conduct,
the state is permitted jurisdiction over acts committed within its terri-
torial boundaries. 41 Thus, although five possible bases for jurisdiction
exist in international law,"s American courts deciding transnational se-
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 415. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 524 (8th Cir.
1973); Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1335 (2d Cir.
1972); but see Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir. 1975).
39. 592 F.2d at 420. The court cited IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,1017 (2d Cir.
1975), which stated: "We do not think Congress intended to allow the United States to
be used as a base for manufacturing fradulent security devices for export, even when
these are peddled only to foreigners." Id.
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. § 17 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such conse-
quences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory.
Id. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); Research in
International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School: Ju-
risdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435, 480-81 (Supp. 1935) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Research in International Law].
41. Buschman, supra note 1, at 242.
42. The four other principles of jurisdiction are the nationality principle (provides
states jurisdiction over its citizens regardless of where the conduct occurred), the protec-
tive principle (states have the power to prescribe rules of law attaching consequences to
extraterritorial conduct that threatens national security or governmental operations), the
universality principle (permits jurisdiction over a person who.has committed an act and
who is held in custody) and the passive principle (states may exert jurisdiction over con-
duct injurious to its citizens). See generally Research in International Law, supra note
40, at 445. The passive principle is expressly rejected by § 30(2) of the RESTATMNT. "A
state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of attaching legal consequences to
conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects
one of its nationals." RESTATEMENT, supra note 40, § 30(2).
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curities cases have utilized and developed only one of these-the terri-
torial principle. In an attempt to address the maximum range of situa-
tions, courts have developed two corollaries of this principle. The first
development is the objective territorial principle, more commonly
known as the effects doctrine, which permits subject matter jurisdic-
tion over conduct which has occurred abroad but which has produced a
foreseeable and substantial effect within the territory." Thus, jurisdic-
tion is established over actions initiated outside a state, but are con-
summated within its territorial boundaries.44 This principle was upheld
by the United States Supreme Court in Strassheim v. Daily.45 The
Court stated that "acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in
punishing the cause of harm as if he (the perpetrator) had been pre-
sent at the effect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its
power."'"4
The second development is the subjective territorial principle,
known as the conduct doctrine. This permits jurisdiction over acts
commenced within a state, but consummated elsewhere.'7 Thus, a state
will be able to address conduct carried out within its territorial bound-
aries even if the effects are felt exclusively abroad.4 The locus of the
43. Section 18 of the RESTATEMENT provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory,
if. . . (b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and forseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMAET, supra note 40, § 18. This principle is best illustrated by what Professor
Loss refers to as the "classic case of the shot across the boundary..." Loss, supra note
2, at 469 (describing § 18, comment c, illus. 2).
44. See Research in International Law, supra, note 40, at 487-94. See also People v.
Adams, 3 Denio 190 (1848), in which the accused in Ohio made false representations
through an innocent agent in New York whereby money was fraudently obtained from a
New York firm. The New York Supreme Court granted jurisdiction, finding that-
The fraud may have originated and been concocted elsewhere, but it became
mature and took effect in the city of New York, for there the false pretenses
were used with success .... The crime was there .... Personal presence, at the
place where a crime is perpetrated, is not indispensable to make one a principal
offender in its commission.
Id. at 206-07.
45. 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
46. Id. at 285.
47. See Research in International Law, supra note 40, at 484-87. See also Hacker &
Rotunda, supra note 1, at 648.
48. See RESTATEMENT § 17, supra note 40.
1982]
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crime is considered to be wherever the act or ommission itself
occurred."
Either one of these principles or a combination of the two may be
used as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over claims resulting
from securities transactions.10 If the transaction in question satisfies
only one of these tests, it is still possible that the court will grant sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. Any transaction directly or indirectly affecting
or involving American citizens or interests, arguably, should come
under the jurisdiction of American courts. The enforcement of this
standard, however, would involve the American judiciary in all but a
minority of securities transactions taking place in various parts of the
world. In an attempt to impose limitations, especially with respect to
the consideration of conduct, courts have required a showing of "signif-
icant impact." 1 Understandably, the mere incidental use. of the means
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, specifically telephones
and the mails, will not provide a sufficient basis for the grant of juris-
diction. If a court has decided that redress must be given to the plain-
tiff, it may be willing to employ a less stringent standard in the evalua-
tion of the significance of the impact.
In Continental Grain, the Eighth Circuit found that jurisdiction
may be based solely on the application of the conduct test. 2 Given the
troublesome task of assigning a situs to an act of nondisclosure, this
case illustrates the difficulty of predicting which arrangement of facts
will cause a court either to apply one test or another, or merely to de-
cide that jurisdiction is proper and then seek an appropriate categori-
zation. Although the landmark case of Schoenbaum v. Firstbrookss re-
lied on the effects doctrine, this note focuses instead on those cases
relying on the conduct doctrine. This examination will place the deci-
sion of the Eighth Circuit in context, and will show that the decision of
that court to grant subject matter jurisdiction was largely a policy deci-
sion, although it was not inconsistent with previous decisions.
49. See Research in International Law, supra note 40, at 487.
50. See Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 416-17. This court notes, however, that it
agrees "jurisdiction may be established by meeting the requirements of either, not both,
the conduct or effects test." Id. at 417.
51. Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 1, at 648-49. These authors argue that tests devel-
oped for the transnational application of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws should not be uniformly extended throughout the '34 Act to cover proxy fights or
short-swing profits, because to do so would impose regulation on the internal affairs of
foreign companies seeking access to United States securities markets. Id. at 648, 663-66.
52. 592 F.2d at 417.
53. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See supra note
5 for a discussion of this case.
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In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell," the
Second Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction appropriate where the
alleged fraudulent conduct involved allegations that misrepresenta-
tions were made to the officers of a United States corporation, and
these misrepresentations prompted the Americans to purchase a Brit-
ish corporation's stock at a price in excess of its actual value." Plain-
tiffs claimed that the purchases" were induced by a series of state-
ments communicated both to and from the United States by telephone
and mail.5 7 Judge Friendly characterized these actions as conduct
"within the U.S.,"" which was an essential link in Leasco's purchase of
the securities.59 It was not necessary for the shares purchased to be
listed on a domestic stock exchange for the 1934 Act to apply
extraterritorially."
The Leasco court refrained from making a sweeping application of
the 1934 Act based solely on the detrimental effect on American inves-
tors of a transaction largely taking place abroad. Judge Friendly found
that subject matter jurisdiction was proper, not only because of the
impact of this transaction on an American corporation, but also be-
cause the purchases were induced by conduct occuring in this country.
The Second Circuit did not have to go as far as the Eighth Circuit in
Continental Grain. Because it found both "significant conduct within
the United States [misrepresentations in U.S. territory] and a direct
impact on U.S. investors, the [Leasco] court was not required to decide
whether one or both facts-conduct and effects-would be enough to
support subject matter jurisdiction."O1 The Continental court, in com-
parison, found no measurable or significant domestic effect of the
fraud,e2 and premised its finding of subject matter jurisdiction solely
54. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. Id. at 1330-33, discussed in Comment, The Trananational Reach of Rule 10b-5,
121 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1361, 1366-68 (1973). See also Johnson, Application of Federal Se-
curities Laws to International Securities Transactions, 45 ALa. L. Rov. 890, 908 (1981).
56. 468 F.2d at 1330.
57. The purchases took place on the London Stock Exchange and were affected by
Leasco's foreign subsidiary, which ultimately invested 22 million dollars. Id. at 1332.
58. Id. at 1335.
59. Id. (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 385 (1970)).
60. Id. at 1336. "Since Congress thus meant 10(b) to protect against fraud in the sale
or purchase of securities whether or not these were traded on organized United States
markets, we cannot perceive any reason why it should have wished to limit the protec-
tion to securities of American issuers." Id.
61. Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 1, at 650.
62. The court was not convinced by Continental's argument that "its loss as reflected
in the financial statements of its parent American corporation, constitute[d] a domestic
effect under the effects test." 592 F.2d at 417.
19821
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upon conduct within the United States."
Written and telephonic communications were also adequate
grounds to support subject matter jurisdiction in Travis v. Anthe Im-
perial Limited." Travis, a Canadian corporation, made a tender offer
to the shareholders of another Canadian corporation for the purpose of
merger. 6" Plaintiffs, American citizens who were shareholders in the
target company," alleged that the two corporations had led them to
believe that if they retained their stock until after the expiration of the
tender offer to Canadian stockholders, a separate offer would be made
to American stockholders." Having relied on a series of communica-
tions made both by mail and by telephone," the plaintiffs eventually
sold their holding for less than they would have received at the begin-
ning of the tender offer."9 Reversing the district court, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that subject matter jurisdiction "attaches whenever there had
been conduct with respect to alleged violations in the United States,"
even if the stock in question was not listed on an American exchange."0
The appeals court, viewing the communications between the parties in
their totality, found that the communications were "an essential ele-
ment in a slowly unfolding scheme to defraud the plaintiffs" through
the use of the implements of interstate commerce. This view required a
finding of jurisdiction.7 1 The use of the instrumentalities was impor-
tant even though some of the communication took place after the
plaintiffs became aware of the defendants true intent.7 1
When the victim of a securities fraud is an American citizen and
resident, courts may be more amenable to the exercise of transnational
jurisdiction.7 8 Courts may, however, employ different or more stringent
standards of inquiry when the victim resides abroad. The Second Cir-
cuit has attempted to address the question of what conduct or effects,
63. The mere reflection on the books of Continental's American parent of the loss
caused by this transaction was found to be too remote an effect to provide an adequate
jurisdictional basis. Id.
64. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
65. Id. at 519.
66. Of the 200,640 shares of Anthes common stock held by 100 shareholders of record
in the United States, the plaintiffs owned nearly 80%. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 526. The court focused not on the quantity of the communications between
the parties, but rather on the quality-whether the use of the mails and the telephones
was instrumental in the misleading of the plaintiffs. Id.
69. Id. at 519-20.
70. Id. at 524.
71. Id. at 526.
72. Id. at 527.
73. See Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARv.
L. Rav. 553, 557 (1976) [hereinafter cited as American Adjudication).
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within the United States, would result in a finding of subject matter
jurisdiction. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,74 and its companion case,
liT v. Vencap, Ltd.,75 provided the court with the opportunity to clar-
ify the extent to which § 10(b) could be applied to transnational secur-
ities fraud. In Bersch, a class action was brought on behalf of the pur-
chasers of stock of Investors Overseas Services (IOS), a Canadian
corporation.7 ' The actual public offering did not take place in the
United States and was made pursuant to an allegedly misleading pro-
spectus. 7 The class consisted of three categories of plaintiffs; United
States citizens, both resident citizens and those residing abroad, and
foreign nationals. The prospectuses, which were prepared in the United
States, were sent to potential investors, regardless of their domicile.76
The Court found that the preparatory acts committed in the United
States were an insufficient basis for the grant of subject matter juris-
diction to the claims of the foreign plaintiffs, 79 because they failed to
make the required showing that the acts within the United States di-
rectly caused their losses.6 0 The court required a showing from the
Americans residing abroad, that the acts committed within the United
States were "of material importance." 1 A much higher showing of ma-
teriality is required for jurisdiction to be granted to these classes of
74. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Note, Extraterritorial Application of 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - The Implications of Bersch v. Drexel Fire-
stone, Inc. and HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 33 WASH. & Lim L. Rxv. 397 (1976).
75. 519 F. 2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Comment, Extraterritorial Application of
United States Securities Laws-IT v. Vencap Ltd., 42 Mo. L. Rzv. 158 (1977).
76. 519 F.2d at 977-78. lOS was an international investment enterprise managed by
Bernard Cornfeld. 1OS controlled offshore mutual funds, banks and several financial en-
tities. See Bukovac, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud, 9
N.Y.U. J. rT'L . & POL. 113, 114 (1976).
77. The plaintiffs alleged that the underwriters and the accountants, Arthur Ander-
son & Company, knew or should have known of the misrepresentations contained in the
prospectus regarding IOS's financial condition. 519 .F.2d at 985 n.24.
78. The prospectuses were mailed from foreign post offices to potential investors. Id.
at 987. While the majority of the purchasers were not United States citizens, a certain
number of shares were purchased, pursuant to the receipt of the prospectuses, by Ameri-
cans residing both in the United States and abroad. Id. at 977-78. "The mailing of pro-
spectuses into the United States was 'assumeld]' by the court of appeals." American
Adjudication, supra note 73, at 558 (quoting Bersch, 519 F.2d at 991).
79. 519 F.2d at 993. In contrast, the court found that the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws applied to the losses of the American plaintiffs residing in the
United States, "whether or not acts [or culpable failures to act] of material importance
occurred in this country." Id.
80. Id. The securities laws "[dlo not apply to losses from sales of securities to for-
eigners outside the United States unless acts [or culpable failures to act] within the
United States directly caused such losses." Id.
81. Id.
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plaintiffs. The acts must not be merely preparatory.82
Vencap was another case based upon the IOS collapse. The liqui-
dators of IT, a Luxembourg investment trust owned by IOS, sued
Vencap, a Bahamian "venture capital firm" of which IT was a pre-
ferred stockholder. 83 Vencap was formed by an American citizen, Rich-
ard Pistell, ' 4 and incorporated in the Bahamas, where the closing of
IIT's investment took place. 6 During September 1972, a draft of a sub-
scription agreement for three million dollars of Vencap stock to be pur-
chased by IT was prepared by Vencap's New York law firm, although
the closing took place in the Bahamas."' After the investment was
made, Pistell caused a large amount of the funds to be diverted to his
own personal use and he maintained a New York office as a base from
which mail was received and the transactional records were main-
tained.8 7 Although there were some Americans involved, they consti-
tuted only 2% of the total investors and their total investment repre-
sented only .5% (of $15,000), because it had been intended that
Vencap shares were not to be offered to American residents or citi-
zens." The court did not deem the existence of American investors sig-
nificant enough to use this fact as the basis of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The court instead focused on the transactions; the conduct which
took place within the United States after the closing. The diversion of
the Vencap funds was viewed as the end-product of the entire fraud
and "had such misuse of IIT's invested funds not occurred, there
would have been no violation of Rule 10b-5's standards."s
Although other courts have followed the Bersch-Vencap analysis,
that to afford jurisdiction to the plaintiff's claim, domestic conduct
must be the direct cause of losses,' 0 the Third Circuit in SEC v.
Kasser"1 focused instead on the quality of the activities in the United
82. Id. at 992. "While merely preparatory activities in the United States are not
enough to trigger application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located
abroad, they are sufficient when the injury is to Americans so resident." Id.
83. 519 F.2d at 1003-07.
84. Id. at 1004. See also American Adjudication, supra note 73, at 560 n.76.
85. See American Adjudication, supra note 73, at 560.
86. Bukovac, supra note 76, at 122.
87. 519 F.2d at 1016-17.
88. Id. at 1018. See also American Adjudication, supra note 73, at 560-61.
89. American Adjudication, supra note 73, at 562.
90. See, e.g., FOF Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (drafting of misleading stock circulars within the United States not a
direct cause of fraud within the United States because the misleading information was
communicated to defrauded purchaser in Canada). See also American Adjudication,
supra note 73, at 562.
91. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn. Churchill Forest Industries (Mani-
toba) Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
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States. In the Third Circuit proceeding, the SEC brought an injunctive
proceeding against Kasser, an American citizen, alleging that he had
fraudulently induced the Manitoba Development Fund"9 to enter into
an investment contract with two corporations that he controlled." The
Fund was to make loans to the defendant corporations in exchange for
debentures" upon certification that Kasser had invested equity capital
in the two corporations because both the loans and equity proceeds
were to be used for forest development."5 In reality, the purported eq-
uity investments were made, not with new capital, but rather with the
loan proceeds received from The Fund, laundered through various
sources."
Although the Third Circuit found that the fraudulent activities
did not have effects in the United States, (the sole victim was a Cana-
dian corporation), the court held that the conduct taking place in this
country was not merely preparatory to the fraud committed abroad.
This constituted a sufficient basis for subject matter jurisdiction." The
court, in making its decision, took notice of activities such as negotia-
tions, incorporation of one defendant corporation in the United States,
maintenance of books and records and the use of the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce (phones and mail)." Viewed as a whole, the
conduct was much more substantial than that in either Vencap or
Bersch. That is the reason the conduct was not dismissed as merely
preparatory and consequently inadequate to support jurisdiction."
The Kasser court frankly admitted that its finding of jurisdiction
was largely a policy decision, but enumerated so-called "sound-ratio-
nales"' 0 for asserting jurisdiction. In essence, the court sought to frus-
92. The Manitoba Development Fund was a corporation wholly owned by the Prov-
ince of Manitoba, Canada. The Fund's purpose was to attract private sources of capital
to the development and financing of a forestry complex in Manitoba. 548 F.2d at 111.
93. The two corporations named as defendants were Churchill Forest Industries (a
Canadian corporation with offices in Montclair, N.J.) and River Sawmills Company (a
Delaware corporation with offices in the same N.J. location). Both were owned and con-
trolled by Kasser. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. See also Johnson, Application of Federal Securities Laws to International
Securities Transactions, 45 ALs. L. Rav. 890, 914 (1981).
96. The money received in the loan payments was filtered through various bank ac-
counts and corporations in the United States, Switzerland and Canada. Some of the 45
million dollars was eventually diverted by the defendants for their personal use. 548 F.2d
at 111.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 115. See also Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds,
Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 419 (8th Cir. 1979).
100. 548 F.2d at 116. See also Johnson, supra note 95, at 915.
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trate any intent to use the United States as a base of operations for the
defrauding of foreign securities purchasers and sellers.' °1 The court felt
that denial of jurisdiction could facilitate the creation of a haven for
defrauders, or as the court called it, a "Barbary Coast, as it were, har-
boring international securities pirates.' 1 02 The court was also con-
cerned about potential responses of other countries and hoped to en-
courage effective international antifraud enforcement.' °3 Finally, the
court emphasized that the grant of jurisdiction was consistent with the
congressional intent of the antifraud provisions of the securities acts
designed "to insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions
within this country."' '
The policy oriented approach articulated in Kasser also formed
the basis for the grant of jurisdiction in Continental Grain.0 5 Clearly
there was no effect on either American interests or securities due to the
alleged fraudulent omission. The court was not convinced by the plain-
tiffs' argument that jurisdiction should be granted on the basis of the
effects within the United States-the loss as reflected in the books of
Continental's parent company.'06 This event was held to be too remote,
based upon the Second Circuit's holding in Bersch that generalized ad-
verse effects are insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.'
The physical closing of the sale of PacSeeds took place in Austra-
lia, as noted above. 08 Yet, the essence of the allegation of fraud, the
nondisclosure of the impending reclamation of the seed stock and non-
renewal of the contract for its use, was conduct devised and completed
in the United States. The telephone calls and letters from Claussen
urging Northrup King officials to refrain from "spoiling the deal with
Continental,"'" all involved the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce. Given the task of actually assigning a situs to this fraud, the
Eighth Circuit found that the scheme took place in the United States
and was then "exported" to Australia."10
After having considered the precedents going back to
101. 548 F.2d at 116.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 916-17.
106. 592 F.2d at 417.
107. 519 F.2d at 989.
108. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
109. The court noted that the use of letters and telephone calls was necessary not
only for the furtherance of the scheme, but also for the actual organization and comple-
tion of the fraud. 592 F.2d at 420. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515,
524 n.16 (8th Cir. 1973).
110. 592 F.2d at 420.
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Schoenbaum, and having determined that the effects test could not be
satisfied, the Court turned to the "direct cause" requirement of Bersch
and Vencap.1" The conduct in this case met the materiality require-
ment of Vencap because it was not merely preparatory, but directly
caused the losses, as required in Bersch.1 ' The test actually employed,
however, was closer to that applied by the Third Circuit in Kasser.
The Continental court made particular note of its belief that Kasser
extended the boundaries of domestic conduct required for the grant of
jurisdiction set forth in Bersch and Vencap.11' The test employed in
Kasser was that jurisdiction was proper if, "at least some activity
designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within this country. 114
The Continental court extended Kasser further, finding jurisdiction
proper if, "defendant's conduct in the United States was in furtherance
of a fraudulent scheme and was significant with respect to its
accomplishment." ' 15
After going through a rather extensive review of earlier cases and
the development of this standard, the court admitted that the finding
of subject matter jurisdiction in this case was basically a policy deci-
sion.116 Although the court conceded that this was essentially a foreign
transaction with domestic conduct limited largely to the use of the
mails and telephones, it strongly argued that the finding of jurisdiction
was nonetheless warranted.11 7 To support its decision, the court relied
upon the Kasser court's finding that the "securities acts expressly ap-
ply to 'foreign commerce' thereby evincing a Congressional intent for a
broad jurisdictional scope for the 1933 and 1934 Acts."'16 Although the
Eighth Circuit concluded that the global reach of securities laws re-
quires either significant domestic impact or conduct, the general pur-
pose of the laws is to mandate levels of conduct in securities transac-
tions." ' This court apparently used flexible standards in determining
whether certain conduct is sufficiently "significant" to warrant a grant
of jurisdiction. It was so anxious to prevent the United States from
becoming a base for fraudulent securities schemes, that it provided few
guidelines as to how minimal the effects must be before the court will
find no jurisdictional basis. Indeed, had Claussen simply maintained
111. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 917.
112. See Bukovac, supra note 76, at 123.
113. 592 F.2d at 418-19.
114. Id. at 415.
115. Id. at 421.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 548 F.2d at 114 (footnote omitted).
119. 592 F.2d at 409.
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silence with regard to the reclamation and not written or spoken to the
others, it appears that jurisdiction may still have been found."' 0
As the Continental court noted, "the presence or absence of any
single factor which was considered significant in other cases dealing
with the question of federal jurisdiction in transnational securities
cases is not necessarily dispositive" in future cases."' Because every
subsequent case adds a perhaps unanticipated and unique variation,
the total scope of Rule 10b-5 may ebb and flow with the circumstances
of each case and the jurisdiction in which it arises. One of the more
recent variations has been with regard to the application of Rule 10b-5
in derivative actions. liT v. Cornfeld33 involved the question "whether
because of the complicity of management there could be fraud against
HT itself unless there was an independent deception of its fundholders
by its foreign management, which, if proved, could only have taken
place outside the United States." 38 As in the earlier Second Circuit
decision in Schoenbaum,' "the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
arose in a context in which the persons managing the defrauded entity
were allegedly implicated in the fraud.'" '
The plaintiff, IIT, was an international investment trust organized
under the laws of Luxembourg and was controlled by its parent, IIT
Management Co., S.A., a Luxembourg corporation. The latter corpora-
tion was controlled by its Canadian parent, Investors Overseas Services
(IOS),126 which was run by Bernard Cornfeld until 1970 and then by
Robert Vesco. The complaint, brought by the liquidators of HT, was
based upon three series of acquisitions by IIT of securities of corpora-
tions run by an American oil and gas entrepeneur, John M. King.'31
The first was an acquisition of debentures of a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of King Resources Company. These debentures were convertible
into the parent corporation's stock. Although purchased mostly in Eu-
rope, the debentures were also alleged to have been purchased in the
United States through one of the defendants, Arthur Lipper Corpora-
tion.3 8 The second purchase was of the common stock of King Re-
sources. This acquisition was also made through Lipper. The third ac-
quisition was the purchase of a convertible note from the Colorado
120. See also Johnson, supra note 95, at 917.
121. 592 F.2d at 414.
122. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. Johnson, supra note 95, at 917-18.
124. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
125. 619 F.2d at 913.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 914.
128. Johnson, supra note 95, at 918.
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Corporation, a private company controlled by John King." ' The com-
plaint alleged that these transactions took place as part of a scheme to
defraud and raid IIT by both those in charge of IOS and by King. The
complaint further alleged that the scheme was perpetuated by United
States accounting and brokerage firms which aided and abetted the
fraud by certifying false financial statements and underwriting securi-
ties offerings with the knowledge of the fraud.8 0
The Second Circuit found subject matter jurisdiction proper in
this case. Judge Friendly, writing for the court, stated that when direc-
tors are parties to the fraud, deception can be found "by viewing this
fraud as though the independent stockholders were standing in the
place of the defrauded corporate entity.' 131 Using this theory, Judge
Friendly found the participation of several American defendants to be
of more significance than had the district court. In the opinion, great
emphasis was placed on the purchase of American securities by IIT,
the Luxemborg trust. While "the American nationality of the issuer or
the consummation of the transaction in the United States is [n]either a
necessary [nior a sufficient factor, . . . the presence of both these fac-
tors points strongly toward applying the anti-fraud provisions of our
securities laws."13' There was no difficulty finding subject matter juris-
diction with regard to IIT's purchase of King Resources common stock
and the Colorado Corporation. These transactions were consummated
completely within the United States. Although purchased on European
markets, subject matter jurisdiction was found over the action arising
from the purchase of the debentures because the debentures were is-
sued by an American corporation and the court viewed them as "Amer-
ican" securities.133
The court was able to distinguish this case from Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc.134 on the basis of the dominance of essentially foreign
activity in Bersch and on the basis of the essentially American charac-
ter of the transactions involved in Cornfeld. Moreover, in Cornfeld, the
work occurred predominately within the United States,8 5 therefore,
the district court's order dismissing the case for lack of subject matter
129. Id.
130. Hacker & Rotunda, supra note 1, at 654.
131. 619 F.2d at 918 (citing Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968)).
132. 619 F.2d at 918.
133. Id.
134. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
135. 619 F.2d at 920-21. As the court noted, "[determination whether American ac-
tivities directly caused losses to foreigners depends not only on how much was done in
the United States, but also on how much (or in this determinination how little) was done
abroad." Id.
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jurisdiction was reversed.
Continental Grain and lIT v. Cornfeld viewed together indicate
the contours of the application of Rule 10b-5, and to a certain extent,
how broadly this rule can be extended. Although minor contacts will be
overlooked, it would be hard to develop a clear rule as to how far a
defendant will have to go to prevent being brought within the confines
of American securities laws. Realistically, Cornfeld may be more easily
understood because of the depth of the fraud itself as well as its effect
on a great number of investors. The essence of all of these cases and of
these last two cases in particular, however, is the desire on the part of
American courts to prevent the United States from becoming a "Bar-
bary Coast" harboring international securities pirates.1
CONCLUSION
While the Continental court concedes that its decision is largely
based on policy considerations, it recognizes that all other transna-
tional securities decisions have been based on the same policy consid-
erations. Yet when Congress decided to regulate the markets, the po-
tential for transnational expansion was inherent. As securities markets
and activities become more extensive and global in scope, so does the
need for their regulation. As long as courts confine themselves to a
rather stringent standard of domestic conduct and/or impact, there is a
small chance that the application of American securities laws will in-
fringe too much on international law. In the interests of fair markets
and standards of conduct, it would appear to defeat the underlying
purpose of Congress to limit "to strictly jurisdictional reasons," the de-
terminations in these actions against "defendants who unleash from
this country a pervasive scheme to defraud a foreign corporation."1"7
Marjorie A. Silverman
136. 548 F.2d at 116.
137. Id. at 114.
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